I.
Introduction: The Global Financial Crisis of [2007] [2008] The crisis of 2007-2008 resulted from massive institutional failure at a global level. It involved all kinds of entities-financial intermediaries, regulators, rating agencies, and international organizations. It also proved the regulatory and supervisory framework for the financial system in core developed economies to be clearly deficient.
The conceptual and intellectual underpinnings (efficient market hypothesis, etc…) of the -light regulation‖ approach led to the widespread belief that market discipline was sufficient to sustain financial stability.
The crisis is a clear example that price stability does not bring about financial stability. On the contrary, it is precisely during periods of price stability and easy financial conditions that the seeds for asset bubbles and the subsequent bursts germinate at rapid and sometimes uncontrollable rates. 1 Lightly regulated financial markets have proven to be insufficient to allocate resources efficiently and manage risk.
The recognition of this reality has led to efforts at strengthening and capitalizing the financial system. But for all the efforts that have taken place over the past three years, the fundamental intellectual structure and paradigm shift that is needed to achieve a stable financial system is yet to be developed.
Several additional factors, of course, contributed to the formation of the crisis. These include, among others, external imbalances, excessively lax global monetary policy, distortions in risk-adjusted prices for credit and other financial instruments, the unfounded belief that home prices in the U.S. would continue to rise indefinitely, and the opaque exposure of financial institutions to high-risk products.
II. The Legacy of the Financial Crisis
To offset the effects of the crisis, authorities in the epicenter implemented both monetary and fiscal countercyclical policies. Without these measures, the real and financial consequences would probably have been much worse. Despite such efforts, the stimulus adopted in advanced countries has not proved as effective as in previous recoveries. In fact, GDP in the six largest industrialized countries is still below pre-crisis peaks. This illustrates both the severity of the recession and the slow recovery process in the developed world. Also, labor markets have not responded as expected.
The reasons for this lie mostly in the very rapid growth of household and financial leverage in the major developed economies prior to the crisis, the unprecedented large credit and/or property bubbles, and the subsequent adjustment and deleveraging process in which we are still immersed (see figure 1 ). As alarming as these numbers appear, the need for fiscal consolidation does not hold the same level of urgency across the developed world.
For instance, the U.S. is not facing an immediate fiscal crisis. The U.S.
downgrade by Standard and Poor's led to a flight into treasuries rather than away from them. The U.S. is facing an employment and growth crisis and a problem of debt sustainability over the medium term. In truth, at least conceptually, it is much easier to visualize fiscal consolidation in the U.S. than in most other developed economies that need to set government debt on a sustainable course. This is not least because the U.S. government (measured by total spending) is smaller 2 The deterioration government finances in developed markets and fiscal deficits was partly a reflection of the revenue loss due the magnitude of the recession. (IMF -WEO 2010 than those in the rest of the G-10 countries. 4 The real challenge for the U.S. is to stimulate economic growth and job creation in the short term while at the same time credibly addressing the issue of fiscal sustainability in the medium term.
Let's turn to the situation in Europe. In recent weeks capital markets have plummeted while uncertainty continues to grow (see figure 2 ). Yet the European fiscal crisis has been a serious source of concern for almost two years now. The initial causes of the fiscal crisis were narrowly focused on the issue of funding pressures for some countries, particularly Greece. However, contagion to other countries in the periphery spread swiftly, and more recently began to contaminate even core countries due to links between the sovereign debt crisis and the banking sector of the region. Actions taken by European politicians and the ECB seem to belong more to the realm of political economy than the crisis-solving manual. In other words, the European political system has turned a manageable economic situation into a nearly unmanageable political problem. It is worth keeping in mind that the architecture of the ERM did not include the framework for the proper functioning of the monetary union.
Those missing pieces are crucial for answering key questions in the current context. For instance, apart from fiscal coordination, there is no defined mechanism for banks' recapitalization, no debt restructuring procedure or clear debt reduction mechanism. Nor is there even an exit route from the euro for countries that cannot or will not adjust.
A comprehensive set of rules defining how to deal with overly indebted countries without risking the overall health of the system is vital for the European monetary union. In order to preserve the union, European leaders need to establish an effective political mechanism for policy coordination and fiscal decision-making. In the absence of these rules, the introduction of the euro merely substituted foreign exchange risk for credit risk for some of its weakest members. This imperative has been borne out in each and every step of the crisis. The timeline of events of the European crisis can be split into three distinct phases: first, denial; second, recognition; and finally, implementation and action.
 Denial: During the early stages of the crisis, policymakers were divided over whether Greece needed IMF support. Many believed that Greece was a European problem that had to be handled within the existing European framework, and that default or even debt restructuring in the Euro area was not an option.
Apparently, authorities were trying to avoid any possibility of restructuring, as its potential consequences for the Euro system were (and probably still are) unknown. They also aimed to ringfence other countries in the periphery. This, in the end, proved impossible.
 Recognition: It was a long and arduous process for European leaders, passing from anger and disbelief to finally recognize the seriousness of the problem. Gradually, they have realized that weak public finances in several countries undermined the stability of the Union and that the sovereign debt crisis threatened to spread to the banking system. However, the political dynamics in different blocs of countries are still far from converging. problem is one of loss absorption -i.e., who pays for the losses accumulated so far and those that will be added until the problem is finally restored. The longer it takes to restore market confidence that a solution is in place, the larger the losses and the spillover effects to the rest of the world. Initially in the late 1970s, while the global economy expanded and interest rates were relatively low, debt dynamics seemed to be sustainable. Latin America's growth rates exceeded interest rates. But much was explained by cyclical factors. Latin America's growth was mainly driven by public spending, and debt resources were not being used for productive activities. While private and public spending was rising, productivity was not. Once excess liquidity dried up, interest rates rose as anti-inflationary policies were put to place and the global economy decelerated, the unsustainability of Latin America's debt became evident (see figures 5 and 6). Growth stalled and Latin
American countries had to endure a sudden reversal of capital flows. 5 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Fiscal adjustment
In the 80's, the first response to the debt crisis was the implementation of IMF-sponsored stabilization programs-the so-called IMF Stand-By
Programs. These conditioned additional access to international finance-loans from official institutions and refinancing of existing international bank lending-on a significant level of fiscal adjustment, tighter monetary policy, and slimmer public sectors (including the privatization of state-owned enterprises). In my view, there was a clear understanding between the IMF, the U.S. Treasury and commercial banks that Latin America had to adjust without new money or debt restructuring. The claim was that banks were in no position to recognize losses on sovereign lending.
The adjustment resulted in higher primary surpluses. But this response was not enough. Debt-to-GDP ratios continued to rise, and creditworthiness deteriorated even further. Deep recessions were triggered by fiscal adjustments, while lower creditworthiness led to higher interest rates. There was indeed a contradiction in the IMF programs that sought to attain debt sustainability: High primary surpluses were unable to solve debt problems. Lasting primary surpluses were not sufficient to offset the negative effects on economic growth of continued capital outflows, deteriorating terms of trade and the upward pressure of higher default risks on interest rates. Large current account surpluses were needed to service debt. This led to exchange rate policies geared to promote exports, undermining the recovery of domestic markets and boosting inflation even with fiscal adjustment taking place. Indeed, it was through the devaluationinflation policies that external transfers were realized. This is obviously not an option in the European case.
Also, in countries like Mexico, the initial retrenchment and consolidation efforts were also undermined by external shocks such as the international oil price collapse of 1986 (see figure 7 and table 1). In order to contain the effects of its debt crisis, Greece is following today the same path Latin American countries did in the 80's. The first step was fiscal adjustment. In May 2010, the Greek government presented a package which seeking a reduction in the public deficit by 5.6 percent of GDP over the next 5 years (from -8.1 percent in 2010 to -2.6 percent in 2014), contemplated a reduction in debt-to-GDP ratios from 146.1 percent to 142.7 percent in the same period, and assumed that it could eventually go back to the markets in 2011. Clearly, the real exchange rate depreciation helped, which is not an avenue open today to European countries. This was a vital step for eventually achieving medium-and long-term debt sustainability. In addition, external demand conditions were favorable for export growth;
this is not the case today. Concentrating on the fundamental issues of economic policy underpinning a sustainable development process was as important as solving the debt overhang itself.
In the case of Europe, although policymakers are generally aware that debt sustainability is not achievable in the absence of economic growth, only timid steps in the direction of growth-enhancing policies have been taken so far. It is true that implementing structural reforms and austerity measures simultaneously may have been politically easier in the Latin America of the 1980s, where mostly authoritarian regimes were in place. 5 Table 2 illustrates the Latin American -Lost decade,‖ and the declines in per-capita GDP that took place. 
Debt relief
The third step taken in Latin America was debt relief. Even with fiscal adjustment and reforms, by the mid-1980s it was apparent for several countries that their strategies had failed. Growth was absent and debtto-GDP ratios were still increasing. In addition, international capital markets were not providing the resources needed to mitigate running reform program costs, despite the expected future benefits. Growth 5 Even so, not all growth policies were implemented in a timely manner or with enough depth. 
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was barely enough to cover the transfer of resources to creditors, which itself was becoming a drag on growth.
Latin America gradually put sufficient structural policies and domestic fiscal measures in place for sustainable growth to take off. What was missing, however, was the required patience of external creditors to allow for the results. The only way to get a credible commitment was debt relief.
6 Three elements were essential to the success of the new strategy:
 An adequate burden-sharing mechanism, with appropriate incentives for the countries to service the new debt; There is an urgent need to transform the Greek economy into a more productive and competitive one, specially by reducing the high tax burden on labor which discourages hiring, making the judicial system more efficient and removing barriers to growth in specific sectors.  Persistent fiscal adjustment. Even after the Brady Plan, Latin
American countries had to continue pursuing a fiscal adjustment strategy in order to stabilize debt-to-GDP ratios (see table 3 ). In fact, in some cases fiscal adjustment overshooting was needed to sustain the disinflation programs and to give strong fundamentals support to the Brady Plan. European countries still have a long way to go on that front. In order to bring debt-to-GDP ratios back to pre-crisis levels, for example, the GIPS (Greece, surplus of around 2 percent of GDP for the countries mentioned, but would leave governments exposed to high debt ratios in the short and medium terms. 8 In current market conditions, frontloading fiscal adjustment is probably needed (see table 3 ). 
Average Debt 1986-89
Brady Deal Announcement Primary Balance  Recovering market credibility. In the 80s, the Brady Plan was the closure that market participants needed. More than the haircut per se, it was the change of regime that allowed Latin American countries to restore creditworthiness and debt sustainability. The main point here is that the consequent change in market perception successfully put an end to the debt crisis. Europe has a long way to go in the process of regaining credibility. European authorities have to deal with an extremely complex crisis that has both an economic and a political dimension.
On the economic sphere, there are a number of immediate problems to tackle, especially:
The Geek program, including the uncertainty of the continued support of the IMF after repeated failures to meet targets. The question of private sector participation, and whether the agreed NPV discounts are meaningful, etc…
The issue of contagion, particularly in Italy, a country that is clearly too big to deal with if it loses market access. [2008] [2009] [2010] The problems of the banking system, which range from signs of systemic funding strains in the interbank market, to questions about the capitalization needs if inter-European claims are valued at market prices.
Average Debt
There are also medium-term fundamental issues to solve: reshaping the institutional framework to foster further integration with a coordinated fiscal approach, and a push for structural measures that could enhance Europe´s growth potential. Of course, both the immediate and medium-term issues feed on each other.
The European saga has now been going on for almost two years, while At the same time, parallel negotiations with the political forces in Mexico (including the congress and the unions) were taking place.
Mexican authorities implemented a harsh austerity program which included higher taxes, increases in energy prices, and expenditure cuts. It was clear that substantial changes had to take place in order for Mexico to come out on the other side. And, as is always the case, big changes imply enormous risks.
The negotiations were fraught with tension, conflict and challenges.
However, by March, a final package and adjustment program were agreed upon. The truth is that, at the time, it was impossible to say whether the measures taken would work. Turning market sentiment around is by no means an easy task, but it is of the essence in resolving a crisis of such proportions.
Fortunately, the program did work in the end, and by mid-1995, less than a year later, Mexico was in a position to enter the capital markets for financing once again, and was able to repay both the U.S. But what if the program is fully implemented but yet insufficient to allow
Greece to return to the markets? To push its debt ratio further down, to 80 percent of GDP for instance, to be able to return to the markets, the country would need to run a primary surplus of 10 percent until the end of this decade. This assumes that nominal growth and interest rates average 3.5 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively. This is more than twice the adjustment achieved in the most ambitious fiscal consolidations on record. 10 On top of that, social resistance to wage and expenditure cuts is escalating, making fiscal retrenchment more complicated.
V. Concluding Remarks
The funding concerns of the Eurozone have broadened to more basic questions regarding the effectiveness of Euro area policymaking and the sustainability of the euro.
The European fiscal crisis has turned into a political crisis, and it is the linkage between the two wherein the problem lies. There is an eroded confidence in the political process, as European leaders have consistently fallen short by giving mixed signals to both debtors and creditors. Although the proposals agreed to on July 21 did show some progress, they were still perceived to be part of a pattern of -too little, too late.‖ The package announced temporarily calmed nerves on Greece (temporarily), but Italian and Spanish bond markets focused on the fact that the EFSF´s new faculties still need to be ratified by the 17
Euro area countries and the outcome is uncertain.
One of the main problems for Europe is that institutions, with the exception of the ECB, are not designed to make decisions, but to deal with processes. Thus, they are ill-equipped to deal with a financial crisis. Only the ECB has the power and ability to make decisions, but the mandate and scope of the bank is in the sphere of monetary policy and financial stability.
However, the escalating crisis and the problems described regarding the institutional framework, have forced a reluctant ECB to go well beyond its traditional responsibilities. The last example is the ECB's taking the role of the IMF and imposing fiscal conditionality in Spain and Italy in exchange for activating the S.M.P. (Securities Market Programme) to purchase Spanish and Italian debt.
The question regarding the effectiveness of policymaking-or lack ofin the Euro area has to do with the absence of political mechanisms (and perhaps political leadership) designed to tackle problems which, in the view of market participants are essential to the viability of the Eurozone.
Furthermore as the fiscal crisis remains unresolved, the concern that policymaking is ineffective has morphed into the question of the very existence of the euro. This is the most difficult and worrisome aspect of the fiscal crisis. The rescue of Greece and the other countries within the IMF-EU programs, is a necessary first step, but it will not end the debacle.
When Greece's debt problems emerged last year, some believed they were trivial given the country's weight in the Euro area's GDP (only 2.5 percent). However, the failure to end this crisis in its early stages triggered a domino effect, putting the sustainability of the ERM at risk.
Basically, two ways out of the Euro debt crisis exist: (1) a fiscal union, or (2) an ERM breakdown. As I mentioned, the establishment of an effective political mechanism of coordination and decision making on the fiscal front seems to be the next step needed to preserve the 
